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Layton and Mercer’s European Civil Practice is an impressive book – and not only 
for its size! It gives practitioners and scientists a good overview of the Brussels-Lugano 
regime with many references to literature and case law, also from other European 
countries. It certainly is an important book, together with other studies on European 
Procedural law, such as Jan Kropholler’s Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht and Compé-
tence et execution des jugements en Europe by Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon. In my view, 
however, these two books are more accessible than Layton and Mercer’s edition. 
Finally, the publication of 21 national reports on procedural law in the second volume is 
interesting, but it is not really related to the topics discussed in the first volume. Volume 
2 is interesting for comparative purposes, but not really necessary for understanding the 
Brussels-Lugano regime. My advice to the general editors would be to disconnect these 
two volumes and to focus on the first volume for new editions, hopefully sooner than in 
15 years.
P. Vlas
Editor-in-Chief
a. orford, ed., International Law and Its Others, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2006, xiv + 420 pp., UK£ 60 / US$ 110. ISBN 0-521-
85949-2.
doi: 10.1017/S0165070X0723551X
What have Carl Schmitt, Abraham and Isaac, post-Glorious Revolution England, 
humanitarism, corporate power, Creole consciousness, unlawful combatants, indige-
nous Australians, secrets of the fetish, Richard Rorty, and female genital mutilation in 
common? The short – and superficial – answer is that they all appear in Anne Orford’s 
edited volume International Law and Its Others. As the wide range of topics identi-
fied above indicates, the term ‘others’ in the title of this book should not be understood 
in a narrow sense: it covers persons or groups that are ‘other’ to international law, but 
also other traditions, narratives, anxieties, disciplines, and much more. Still, Interna-
tional Law and Its Others is more than a random collection of essays on the boundaries 
of international law. The book has a distinct identity, already contained in the very 
question it poses: how does international law relate to its others? Posing such a question, 
as Orford sets out in the introductory chapter, grounds the book in a ‘critical project 
which has an established trajectory within international law’ (p. 3). 
One of the central aims of critical, ‘new stream’ approaches has always been to 
critique international law’s pretensions to inclusiveness and objectivity, as to reveal and 
give voice to what is forgotten, suppressed, obscured by mainstream international legal 
discourse. Such a mission can also be found throughout Orford’s edited volume. An 
example is Ian Duncanson’s fascinating analysis of the forgotten history of sovereignty 
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and politics as it was developed after the Glorious Revolution. In response to experi-
ences of civil disorder, Duncanson demonstrates, writers from Locke to Saftesbury, 
as well as the Scottish literati, searched for cultural solutions to the problems of peace 
and stability: ‘A whole way of life was developed, creating social spaces, manners of 
address and the choreography of bodies designed, not to produce consensus, but to allow 
differences to be negotiated …’ (pp. 57, 58). Duncanson invites international lawyers to 
engage with this forgotten history, to rediscover politeness – and not just policy – as part 
of the polity, and to critically rethink the ways in which scholars have reproduced the 
Westphalian myth of unitary sovereignty. Another, though quite different, example of a 
forgotten (or suppressed) history of international law is offered by Frédéric Mégret, who 
provides a post-colonial analysis of international humanitarian law. Mégret attempts to 
demonstrate that practices such as Guantanámo are less foreign to international humani-
tarian law than many believe. Based on a reading of the genesis of modern humanitarian 
law, he critiques narratives of progress that project humanitarian law as an ever more 
inclusive legal regime. Instead, he offers a reading in which the rise of international 
humanitarian law goes hand in hand with practices of exclusion and colonial expansion. 
The legacy of this colonial history can still be found, Mégret argues, in the way in which 
contemporary humanitarian law ‘projects a fantasy of soldiering’ that conforms ‘to what 
is essentially a Western stereotype of what waging war is’ (p. 307). Such dominant 
fantasies have important repercussions for those that use political violence in different, 
‘uncivilized’ forms. 
That ‘otherness’ sometimes works in complex and dialectical ways, is illustrated by 
Liliana Obregón’s chapter on the civilisation discourse in 19th century Latin America. 
Obregón studies the emergence of a distinct legal consciousness by the American-born 
elite of Spanish descent in post-independent Latin-America (the ‘Creole legal conscious-
ness’). A central tenet of the Creole legal consciousness was ‘the will to civilize’; the 
desire to complete the civilization that was left half-way by the Spanish colonizers. Part 
of this civilizing mission was the anxiety to gain recognition by Western powers in order 
to avoid exclusion of Latin-American states from the (legal) community of civilized 
nations. At the same time, however, it comprised the will to be recognised as ‘other’; 
as independent and distinct from Europe. Obregón demonstrates how this complex will 
to civilize appears in different ways in the writings of Carlos Calvo, Manuel Atanasio 
Fuentes and José María Samper, thus providing new perspectives on the role of ‘civili-
sation’ in 19th century international legal discourse. 
Such critical and historical approaches to international law make Orford’s book 
interesting in and of itself. The volume contains several chapters that challenge 
established orthodoxies in international legal discourse, while pointing at new directions 
and perspectives to discuss issues of (1) sovereignty, (2) human rights, (3) the relation 
to the other, and (4) history (the four parts in which the book is divided). However, the 
book is also interesting for another reason. It tells something about current discourses 
within critical legal scholarship, about the basic concerns and anxieties of an approach 
that by now has gained recognition (though not always approval) in the discipline. One 
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such concern, it appears, relates to what is often presented as the increasing openness of 
the international legal order towards ‘the other’; towards groups, discourses, cultures, 
topics, etc. that traditionally fell outside the boundaries of international law. What has 
the growing inclusiveness of international law and politics brought us? What sacrifices 
had to be made for the inclusion of concepts such as human rights in different areas of 
international law? What have been the effects, e.g., in terms of responsibilities, of the 
inclusion of critical approaches such as feminism or humanitarism in international legal 
parlance and in the bureaucratic apparatus of international law and politics? 
Such questions are taken up, inter alia, in the chapter by Dianne Otto, studying 
the effects of the engagement of women’s right’s advocates with human rights law. 
Otto examines three strategies that have been used by feminist human rights advocacy 
since 1945. The first strategy, used by the 1946 Commission on the Status of Women, 
was to ensure explicit reference to rights that were believed to be specific to women’s 
experience, while operating within an overarching framework of equality between 
men and women. The second strategy consisted of the promulgation of a specialized 
women’s human right instrument, resulting in the adoption of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women by the General Assembly 
in 1979. The third strategy, emerging from the late 1980s on, was what Otto calls the 
‘mainstreaming’ of women’s human rights; a strategy that promoted the recognition that 
women’s rights are human rights. The results of the different strategies, Otto argues, 
is unsettling: so far, feminist attempts to make international human rights law more 
inclusive have reproduced unequal relations of gender power. They all failed to resolve 
the ‘feminist conundrum’: ‘in reflecting women’s present gendered experience of human 
rights violations, human rights law repeats the marginalizing gender tropes that entrench 
and naturalize women’s inequality’ (p. 350). Yet, Otto refuses to give up the attempts 
to open up international human rights law. If feminist engagement could effectively 
be based on a radical break with conventional understandings of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, if 
such categories could be understood in a denaturalised and hybrid fashion, it might be 
possible to make human rights law more inclusive: ‘hope is not lost’ (p. 356). 
Critique and new directions for future engagement also figure prominently in David 
Kennedy’s chapter on the institutionalisation of humanitarism. Building on arguments 
already developed in The Dark Sides of Virtue,1 Kennedy argues that humanitarists 
should leave behind the self-image of outsiders who speak law or truth to power. 
Instead, they should acknowledge their role as bearers of power and the ever looming 
possibility that they are engaged in practices that sustain structures of domination (‘We 
have met the empire, and it is us’, p. 151). At the same time, Kennedy cherishes human 
rights as a basis to critique existing claims to justice and as a source for responsible, 
self-critical humanitarism. Humanitarism, then, transcends the moral certainty of the 
do-gooder; it becomes the uncertain, always unfinished basis from which to assume 
responsibility and to critique existing pretensions of justice. The institutionalisation of 
human rights forms the basis of Florian’s Hoffmann’s chapter as well. Hoffmann takes 
as a starting point that ‘today, human rights are a fact of the world’ (p. 225). However, 
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rather than going forward as it were, enquiring the consequences of the normalisation 
of human rights, Hoffmann takes a step back, asking what, if any, epistemological and 
deontological validity human rights could have. Is it possible to accept the relativist 
critique voiced by critical and post-modern scholars and still ‘believe’ in human rights? 
Based on Rorty’s notion of the liberal ironist and Koskenniemi’s ‘culture of formalism’, 
Hoffmann forcefully argues for a human rights activism that accepts the lack of objective 
foundations. In this way, human rights are to be used, not as a form of fixed knowledge, 
but as a permanent source for critique: ‘no hegemonic imposition, no rationality, no 
law, no judgment, no argument is ever safe from being challenged by the many uses of 
human rights’ (p. 244). Human rights essence consists in their ‘enabling transgression’ 
(p. 244); in their potential as a permanent source of (self) critique. This emancipating 
potential of human rights also makes it possible to transcend their institutionalisation 
and to thus remain critical on the facts of our present world. 
The final chapter of International Law and Its Others – written by Hilary Charles-
worth and David Kennedy – opens with an understatement: ‘This book is hard to 
conclude’ (p. 401). It is indeed. It is also hard to review, as the present author can attest. 
The broad conception of ‘the other’ has resulted in a wide variety of sometimes radically 
different chapters that escape any definite conclusions. Those who look for a tightly 
knot-together collection of chapters will therefore be disappointed. However, as I have 
tried to indicate above, readers looking for challenging discussions on the boundaries 
of contemporary international law will enjoy International Law and Its Others. It 
opens sometimes new, at other times long forgotten, or suppressed, perspectives on the 
international legal order. Moreover, it contains refreshing contributions on the current 
state of international law, while suggesting new roads for self-critical legal scholarship. 
Wouter Werner
Professor Public International Law
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
1. D. Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarism (Prince ton, 
NJ, Princeton University Press 2004).
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